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Abstract
The Indonesian Social Safety Net (SSN) health card program was implemented in
response to the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997 to preserve access to health
care services for the poor. Under the program health cards were allocated to poor
households, entitling them with subsidised care at public health care providers, while
the providers themselves received budgetary support to compensate for the extra
demand. This papers looks at the impact of the program on outpatient care utilisation,
and, in particular, endeavours to disentangle the direct effect of the allocation of
health cards from the indirect effect of the transfer of funds to health care facilities. It
finds that the program resulted in a net increase in utilisation for the poor health card
owners while for non-poor health card owners the program resulted mainly in a
substitution from private to public providers. However, the largest effect of the
program seems to have come from a general increase in the supply of public services
resulting from the budgetary support received through the SSN program. These
benefits seem to have been captured mainly by the non-poor. As a result, most of the
benefits of the health card program went to the non-poor, even though the healthcards
itself were distributed pro-poor.  The results suggest that in addition to the need for
targeting the poor, a closer linkage between provision of services to the target groups
and funding would have resulted in a better-targeted program. It also points to
potential impact that such programs can have on the public/private mix if the design
does not take those factors into account.
11. Introduction
In the current debate on the provision of health care services in developing countries,
demand side subsidies for medical care are often argued to be more effective in
reaching the poor than supply side interventions. Health spending is generally found
not to be pro-poor, as public policy typically lacks the incentives for health care
providers to serve the poor (World Bank, 2004). Empirical evidence shows high
income elasticities for health care, and thus large inequalities between poor and rich,
but rather low price elasticities that tend to be larger for the poor (Jimenez, 1995;
Gertler and Hammer, 1997). Targeted prices subsidies for medical care are therefore
often advocated as means to increase access to medical care for the poor. The success
of such targeted demand side interventions critically depends on the ability to identify
and reach the poor.
This case study looks at a very particular kind of health care intervention that
was applied in Indonesia, which included both a targeted price subsidy and a public
spending component. This combined program was part of a larger Social Safety Net
(SSN) program that was initiated to protect the poor from the effects of the Southeast
Asian economic crisis, which hit the country in 1997. 1 Households that were thought
to be most vulnerable to economic shocks were allocated health cards, which entitled
all household members to the price subsidy. Health care facilities that provided the
subsidised care received extra budgetary support to compensate for the increased
demand.
There are some distinct features to the SSN health program.  First, the price
subsidy only applied to public service providers. Private sector health care providers
were not included in the scheme. Second, targeting and allocation of the budgetary
support to health care providers was decentralised to district committees. However,
the transfers were made directly from Jakarta to the public health care facilities,
through specially created accounts at the post office. Third, there was a loose
relationship between the utilisation of the health card and the compensation that the
health care providers received in return. Compensation was allocated to districts based
on the estimated number of households eligible for the health card program and not
based on actual utilisation of the health cards.
                                                
1 The SSN included an education program, a labour creation program and food assistance. See Ananta
and Siregar (1999) and Daly and Fane (2002) for an overview of the SSN programs.
2This paper focuses on the effect of the Indonesian health card program on
demand for primary outpatient health care. The particular design allows us to
investigate a number of interesting questions.
First, it provides the opportunity of an ex post analysis of a health care policy
change. Most studies that discuss the effectiveness of health policy draw on
simulation based health care demand models, which make ex ante predictions of
possible policy scenario’s given some estimated parameters. The drawback of these
simulations is that the underlying estimates reflect the effects of marginal changes in
price, while the sensitivity of health care demand to price changes may well be
different when it concerns large discrete jumps. In effect, these simulations often
concern out of sample prediction where the forecasted interventions lie outside the
range of the observed price data (Gertler and Hammer, 1997). Although ex post
studies do not suffer from this problem, there is relatively little empirical work that
evaluates actual pricing policies in health care. Moreover, only few of these studies
take account of the endogenous nature of public interventions in their estimation
strategy.2 This paper aims to contribute to that literature.
Second, since the health card only entitled the user to free services at public
providers we can directly investigate substitution effects between private and public
providers. This is difficult in health care demand studies, as information on the price
menu offered by alternative health care providers is often not available. As an
alternative to exogenous price data many models estimate the demand for medical
care based on proxy variables derived from (endogenous) household expenditure data3
or variation in indirect cost measures, such as opportunity costs due to loss of work or
travel time to the nearest provider.4 However, opportunity costs do not vary by public
or private provider and the same will often hold for travel time. For instance, doctors
working at public providers in Indonesia also often maintain private practices making
it impossible to use travel time variation to estimate substitution effects. Studies that
                                                
2 Using data from a randomised health insurance and cost sharing experiment in the United States,
Manning et al. (1987) estimate the demand for outpatient care. Gertler and Molyneaux (1997) use
panel data to evaluate an experiment of a user fee increase for outpatient services in Indonesia.
Regarding targeted health care subsidies, the Medicaid program in the US is probably the most studied.
Currie and Gruber (1996) and Currie and Thomas (1995) exploit variation in legislature across states to
control for endogeneity of the program. In an analysis of a school based health insurance scheme in
Egypt, Yip and Berman (2001) treat participation as selection on observables.
3 E.g. Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987), Lavy and Quigley (1993), Ching (1995), Mocan, Tekin
and Zax (2000).
4 E.g., Gertler and Gaag (1990), Dow (1999).
3do manage to identify price variation across provider types generally find substantial
substitution effects between public and private providers as a result of public price
policy.5
The third contribution of this paper is that we compare the effect of a targeted
price subsidy with that of increased public health care spending. We will argue that
the transfers made to the public sector providers benefited all potential users while the
price subsidy was only available to those who received a health card. We make an
attempt to disentangle the two effects. In the health care demand literature policy
scenarios such as reinvesting funds (from raising user fees, for example) into the
public health sector is often discussed and simulated. While appealing for policy, this
requires strong assumptions about the supply response of health care providers (such
as the cost structure and the performance of the government or local authorities). In
case of the SSN intervention we directly observe effect of increased public spending
without making these assumptions. There are empirical studies that use actual
provider or community data to show that an increase in supply and quality of care,
and especially drug availability at health facilities, has a significant effect on
utilisation.6 The problem with these quality and supply variables is that they are often
endogenous due to government policy, and that the measured effects are likely to
capture both supply and demand effects. While some studies manage to control for the
former problem, it is much harder to control for the latter. In this paper we identify
both the health card effect and the effect of the budgetary support on utilisation, and
show that the largest share of the program’s effect is due to increased public spending.
Finally, we evaluate the distribution of the effects of both the demand and
supply side interventions. The literature suggests that the poor are more sensitive to
price effects than the rich.7 But even if households receive their health cards, there
may still be barriers to using these benefits, such as lack of information, regional
shortage of providers, or opportunity costs unabridged by the health card. Such
barriers are likely to vary by population sub-group, households or even individual
                                                
5 E.g., Mwabu, Ainsworth and Nyamete (1993); Sahn, Younger and Genicot (2003).
6 Lavy and Quigley (1993) define quality as the type of provider for a study in Ghana; Lavy and
Germain (1994) find strong effects of supply of drugs, staff and services; Mwabu et al. (1993), Akin,
Guilkey and Denton (1995), and Akin et al. (1998) use facility level data and find large effects of drug
availability; Sahn et al. (2003) use community level data to find similarly strong effects of availability
of drug and medical staff.
7 E.g., Gertler et al. (1987), Manning et al. (1987), Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer (1994), Ching
(1995), Yip and Berman (2001), Sahn et al. (2003).
4characteristics (Blank and Card, 1991; Currie and Thomas, 1995) and are likely to be
higher for the poor. Alternatively, health card recipients may be reluctant to utilise
their benefits simply because of a preconception that subsidised care is of inferior
quality to non-subsidised health care (Arhin, 1994). Given the loose relationship
between SSN budgetary support and the actual use of health cards, it may well be that
health care facilities are reluctant to provide free services, or at least service of similar
quality as provided to non-subsidised patients. In this case the non-poor are likely to
capture a large part of the benefits from extra public health care spending. We find the
effects of price subsidy and the supply impulse to differ by income group. For low-
income groups (with relatively high price elasticity) we find both a substitution from
public to private care and an increase in total utilisation due to the health card, but
little effect from increased spending. However, for the more wealthy groups (less
sensitive to price changes) we find the substitution effect to be more dominant and the
supply-induced effect of the budget increase to be larger, since the rich typically face
less barriers to access to medical care than the poor. Overall, the non-poor captured
most of the benefit, despite pro-poor targeting of the scholarships.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section gives an
overview of the data. In section 3 we describe the health card program in more detail.
Section 4 focuses on the evaluation problem and our strategy for estimating the
impact of the health card on utilisation of medical services. The results are discussed
in section 5, while section 6 highlights some caveats and examines the sensitivity of
the results to the main assumptions of the study. Section 7 concludes.
2. The data
The study is based on data from Indonesia’s nation-wide socio-economic household
survey (Susenas). The 1999 round of this annual survey contained a special module to
measure the use of the SSN interventions, including the health card program. The
survey was fielded in February 1999, while the health card program started in
September 1998. The results of this analysis therefore reflect the experience of the
first months of operation of the program. For this reason, and data limitations, we
limit the analysis to the impact of the program on the access to medical care (in terms
of utilisation), and do not endeavour to estimate the effect on health. Health effects
are likely to take longer to materialise. The survey sampled 205,747 households and
5collected a wide range of socio-economic indicators along with a measure of
consumption. In the area of health, the survey collected information on self-reported
illness, utilisation of medical services, user fees and ownership and utilisation of the
health card. We also use the 1998 Susenas as this provides the pre-intervention data
needed for the analysis. This round is also fielded in February, includes 207,645
households and covers the same questionnaire and variables as the 1999 survey,
except for the SSN programs.
A 1996 village level census (Podes) provides pre-intervention information on
accessibility and supply of health services, and various other community
characteristics. The 1996 Podes includes 66,486 villages (desa) and townships
(kelurahan) and can be merged with the Susenas.
Besides the micro data we also use administrative data concerning the
1998/1999 budget for the Social Safety Net program. This data includes the budget
allocated to 293 districts (kabupaten) to implement the health card program and to
compensate the public health clinics (Puskesmas) and village midwifes (Bidan di
desa) for the expected extra demand for health services resulting from the health card
program. The largest share of this budget was directly transferred to public health care
providers. The transfers were made in two to four phases, depending on the province,
starting in the last quarter of 1998.  By the time of the survey SSN budgets had
arrived at the health centres. It provided a substantial additional source of financing
for the public health clinics. A survey conducted in June 1999 among 3,802 public
health clinics and 3,989 village midwifes provides information on the way in which
the health care providers have spent the SSN funds.
3. Utilisation of medical services and the health card program
The economic crisis hit Indonesia in the fall of 1997, exacerbated by social and
political unrest in 1998. Real GDP decreased by roughly 15 percent in 1998 causing
poverty to increase sharply. Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett (2003) estimate an
increase in the poverty head count ratio from 15 percent in May 1997 to 33 percent at
the end of 1998. As more households moved into poverty, inequality in terms of
household expenditure also increased, especially at the lower end of the income
distribution (Skoufias, Suryahadi and Sumarto, 2000). 1998 saw an annual increase in
the consumer price index of 78 percent. The price of food doubled, with rice and
6staple foods experiencing the most severe price increase. There is little evidence of
rising overall unemployment during the crisis. Instead, real wages dropped by about
40 percent in the formal wage sector during the first year of the crisis, while
agriculture seems to have absorbed part of the displaced labour from other sectors.
(Cameron, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas, 2003).
The severity of the crisis has undoubtedly affected households’ health care
expenditures and utilisation. Frankenberg et al. (2003) find that household
consumption declined by 20 percent in 1998, with investment in human capital (i.e.
health and education) decreasing by 37 percent. Table 1 depicts observed trends in the
utilisation of medical services before and during the crisis. The data are based on a
series of Susenas household surveys and present utilisation of modern health care in
the month of February of each year.8 The table indicates a sharp decrease in the
utilisation of modern health care from 1997 to 1998, which was largely due to
declining utilisation of public sector providers. A breakdown by type of provider is
presented in Table 2 and shows that the decline in public care occurs for the most part
at public health clinics. Waters, Saadah and Pradhan (2003) attribute this trend to a
decline in the quality of public sector providers. The main cause for this quality
deterioration was the growing shortage of drugs and supplies among public facilities
during the crisis, especially in rural areas (Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle, 1999;
Knowles, Pernia and Racelis, 1999). From 1998 to 1999 total utilisation of modern
health care providers remained the same, but the share of the public sector increased.
One possible explanation is the SSN health program, which started during this period.
We will investigate the empirical foundation of this hypothesis.9
The SSN health program follows a decentralised design, where the allocation
of health cards and funds is delegated to lower administrative levels. The amount of
subsidy for public health care providers to be distributed across districts, along with
the number of health cards to be issued, was determined by a pre-intervention poverty
estimate. This poverty measure is constructed by the national family planning board
(Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional – BKKBN) and counts the number
of poor households per district based on the so-called prosperity status. Under this
                                                
8 Modern health care is here defined as public health care providers – hospitals, health clinics
(Puskesmas), village maternity posts (Polindes) and integrated health posts (Posyandu) – and private
providers – hospitals, doctors, clinics and paramedical services. Traditional health care is not included.
7definition a household is deemed poor when they have insufficient funds for any one
of the following: (i) to worship according to faith, (ii) eat basic food twice a day, (iii)
have different clothing for school/work and home, (iv) have a floor not made out of
earth, or (v) have access to modern medical care for children or access to modern
contraceptive methods. The BKKBN regularly collect this information on a census
basis. This BKKBN prosperity measure is rather an unsuitable allocation criterion for
the SSN, since its components are fairly inflexible and inappropriate for measuring
economic shocks or the impact of a crisis. However, at the time of implementation it
was the only up to date welfare measure at hand.
At the district level committees were formed to deal with the allocation of
funds to the health clinics and village midwifes. This allocation was based on the
BKKBN estimate of poor households eligible for a health card in the village or sub-
district (kecamatan) that is served by each public provider. The transfer was not
influenced by the actual services provided to health card owners. The district
committee allocated health cards to villages, again based on the BKKBN measure,
where the village leaders headed village committees. Along with the health cards they
received guidelines on which criteria to use when distributing the health card to
households. Besides households that were classified as poor by the BKKBN, the
village committees were to consider households that were severely affected by the
crisis. The local leaders however maintained a lot of leverage to distribute health
cards according to their own insights. Health cards were usually distributed through
local health centres and village midwifes.
The health card entitled the owner and family members to free services at
public health care providers consisting of (1) outpatient and inpatient care, (2)
contraceptives for women in child bearing age, (3) pre-natal care and (4) assistance at
birth. In this paper we limit ourselves to the impact of the health card program on
outpatient healthcare utilisation.
By February 1999 the health card program was already of a substantial
magnitude with 10.6 percent of Indonesians reporting that their household was
allocated a health card. For the poor this percentage is even higher. Table 3 shows that
18.5 percent of individuals from the poorest quintile had a health card. For people in
                                                                                                                                           
9 Another explanation for the dip in 1998 would be that households postponed preventive care, in
anticipation of the health card. But this is unlikely because the SSN interventions had not been
announced when the 1998 Susenas survey was conducted.
8the second poorest quintile (about half of which are estimated to live below the
poverty line at that time) this is 13.7 percent. So even though we are analysing the
program in its very early stages, it was already in full swing at the time of the 1999
Susenas survey. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for health card owners and
others. Column 1 shows the statistics for households without a health card, while
column 2 shows the characteristics for households that did receive a health card. It
appears that households that own a health card are generally poorer, slightly larger
and work more often in agriculture compared to non-health card owners. Heads of
households with a health card have on average a lower education and are more likely
to be females.
Utilisation of outpatient care is higher amongst households that own a health
card, especially in case of public services. The utilisation rates provided in Table 5
indicate that 15.1 percent of the health card owners visit an outpatient provider during
a period of 3 months, compared to 12.9 percent for the non-health card owners.
Although health card owners tend to choose public providers more often, they do not
always use their health card. 3.7 out of 10.4 percent of the health card owners report
not to use the health card when seeking care at a public provided. Also we find a few
instances that a health card is used while the household head reports not to own a
health card. Technically, these type of occurrences are possible because ownership is
collected from the household head while utilisation is collected by individual.
Qualitative research by Soelaksono et al. (1999) suggests several reasons why health
card owners did not always use their health card for treatment. They find that in some
public facilities, the time allocated to patients with a health card was limited, and that
in remote areas the lack of access to the nearest public facility was a possible deterrent
to use the health card. They also found strong indications that patients perceived the
care received using a health card to be of lower quality than services and medicines
obtained when not using the health card. Ownership of health cards is distributed pro-
poor10. The concentration curves for ownership and utilisation are presented in figure
2. The poorest 20 percent of the population own 35 percent of the health cards. Still
there is considerably leakage to the more wealthy households. Considering that about
10 percent of the households received a health card, perfect targeting would imply
9that all health cards were obtained by the poorest 10 percent of the population.
However, we find that households from the wealthiest 60 percent of the population
own about 40 percent of the health cards. Utilisation of health cards is also pro-poor
but slightly less so. Those who received benefits were on average wealthier than those
who received the card.
The 1999 health facility survey can provide some more insight on how the
SSN health funds have been used. Disbursements to public providers started at the
end of 1998, and they were left fairly free in how to utilise the funds. Table 6 shows
the type of expenses for which the health clinics chose to use the SSN health grants.
The largest fraction (41 percent) of SSN health spending concerned medicines and 12
percent was spent on additional materials. In rural areas the share used for medicine is
far larger than in urban areas (43 and 38 percent respectively). The village midwifes
used 38 percent of the funds for medicine and 16 percent for supplies, both urban and
rural. This reflects the shortage of medicine during the crisis, suggesting that this
problem was especially relevant in rural areas.
4. Impact of Healthcard Program on utilisation
What would have been the utilisation of outpatient health services if the SSN health
card program had not existed? Note that this question comprises two effects: the effect
of the health card program on the health card owners and the effect of the program on
the household that did not receive a health card. The second effect cannot be assumed
to be zero as is usually assumed in an impact evaluation. The additional budgetary
resources, net of what is allocated to serve health card owners at a subsidised rate, can
potentially benefit the entire population living in the area of service of the provider.
We will analyse both effects. Our approach is to treat the two effects as two separate
interventions. One is the distribution of health cards to those in need (the pure health
card program), the second is a general increase in budgetary support to public sector
services.
The maintained assumption is that the first intervention – the distribution of
health cards – did not have any effect on the quality of the public services. It accrues
                                                                                                                                           
10 Following Lanjouw et al. (2002) we use the poverty line as spatial price deflator to control for
relative price differences across regions. The argument behind this approach is that regional poverty
lines capture spatial differences in the cost of living, in that they reflect the level of expenses required
for obtaining some reference level of utility. We use the poverty lines from Pradhan et al. (2001).
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benefits only to those who actually own a health card. The second intervention affects
the whole population. This is a strong assumption, ruling out crowding out effects due
to the health card program. We will investigate the sensitivity to this assumption later
in the paper.
The impact of the first intervention – the distribution of health cards – can be
analysed by forming a control group from the population that did not receive a health
card. Since both health card and non-health card owners benefited from the transfer of
funds to health care providers, this measures the differential effect of owning a health
card conditional on the transfer program. For the second intervention – the general
increase in the budget of public health care providers – it is not possible to create a
control group from the same sample as this intervention affected everyone. The
impact of the total program is estimated using a dynamic approach exploiting the
variation in compensation for the health card program to public health clinics and
village midwifes across districts and the fact that the allocation to districts was based
on pre-intervention poverty estimates. We analyse the utilisation rates before the
introduction of the health card program – based on the 1998 Susenas – and compare
these with the situation right after the introduction of the health card program. The
resulting impact estimate is a result of the two interventions acting simultaneously.
The impact of the general increase in funding to public services is then obtained by
subtracting the former estimate from the latter.
More formally, the combined average impact of the two interventions can be
written as the sum of the two impacts separately. Let ( )jii qhY ,  denote the outcome
for individual i, living in district j, as a function of the two interventions. If a person
lives in a household that has received a health card then hi = 1, while hi = 0 for non-
recipients. qj reflects the SSN budgetary support to public health care providers in the
area where the person lives (indicated by SSNj).
We want to know to what extent the observed development in utilisation from
1998 to 1999 is due to these two interventions. The overall impact of the program that
we want to retrieve can be expressed as a weighted mean of the impact on the
population with a health card (hi = 1, qj = SSNj) and people who did not receive a
health card, but only benefited from the budget increase (hi = 0, qj = SSNj). Assuming
that utilisation of health card owners and that of non-health card owners is
independent, we can write the overall impact as
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(1) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }jjiijjiji
jjiijjiji
SSNqhYESSNqhSSNYEp
SSNqhYESSNqhSSNYEp
==−==−+
==−==
,0|0,0,0|,01
,1|0,0,1|,1
where p = Pr(hi = 1), the probability of receiving a health card.
( )[ ]jjiji SSNqhSSNYE == ,1|,1  reflects the observed average outcome for the
population with a health card, while ( )[ ]jjiji SSNqhSSNYE == ,0|,0  is the observed
average outcome for individuals who did not receive a health card. The other two
terms reflect the expected counterfactual outcomes for the two groups, if the programs
had not been implemented. We can rewrite equation (1), by adding and subtracting
( )[ ]jjiji SSNqhSSNYpE == ,1|,0 , as
(2) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }
( )[ ] ( )[ ]jjijjji
jjijijjiji
SSNqYESSNqSSNYE
SSNqhSSNYESSNqhSSNYEp
=−=+
==−==
|0,0|,0
,1|,0,1|,1
Here the first two terms (weighted by p) give the impact of the pure health card
program conditional on the budget increase, for those who own a health card. We will
refer to this as the direct effect of the program. The last two terms reflect the effect of
budget increase for the whole population, which we will refer to as the indirect effect
of the SSN program.
First, we concentrate on the estimation of the direct effect of the health card
intervention. For obvious reasons, a direct comparison between health card owners
and non-health card owners after the introduction of the program does not yield a
valid impact estimate. The expressions above are conditional upon selection and since
selection was not random, we cannot presume that ( )[ ]jiiji SSNqhSSNYE == ,1|,0  =
( )[ ]jiiji SSNqhSSNYE == ,0|,0 . The health card was distributed to poor households,
and even without a health card their utilisation would have been different from the
relatively wealthier non-health card households.
There are various approaches one can take to correct for this non-random
placement of the program. A frequently used method is propensity score matching,
12
which relies on matching on observables, and the assumption of conditional
independence.11 That is, conditional on a set of observed characteristics selection into
the program can be treated as random (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Holland, 1986).
Recent advances have greatly increased the popularity of this method.12 The success
in reducing the systematic differences between the control and treatment group
increases when more variables are used to match households. However, the more
variables are used, the more difficult it will become to match households. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) proved that if it is valid to match on all of the selected variables
separately, it is equally valid to match on the propensity score only. The propensity
score is the probability of obtaining treatment as a function of the observed matching
variables. This result greatly reduces the dimensionality of the problem. Instead of
having to match on several variables, it now suffices to condition on just one variable,
the propensity score. The propensity score function can be estimated with a logit
model. The unit of our analysis is the household, as health cards were distributed at
this level. Households in the treatment group are matched to households in the
potential control group. Note that as a result, the sample size of the treatment and
matched control group – in terms of individuals – are different as the household sizes
vary.
The main weakness of this method is that one cannot be sure that all
systematic differences between the control and treatment group that influence
utilisation have been removed during the match. The extent in which the propensity
score matching will reduce the bias depends on the specification of the propensity
score model and the quality of the control variables (Heckman et al., 1997). It is
therefore crucial to understand the program design and to include sufficient
information about the selection procedure (at all allocation levels) in the model. There
are three sources of bias that we want to deal with. The first, and most obvious, is the
endogenous placement of health cards with households. Second, since we want to
estimate the pure health card effect, we want to purge it from any effects of the block
                                                
11 We experimented with instrumental variables but abandoned this approach because we are not
convinced that we are able to construct adequate instruments. We used variables that measure the
perception of fairness of the distribution of health cards in the district. But the results were very
sensitive to specification and choice of instrument. We also experimented with 1997 district BKKBN
estimates. However, using 1998 data we found that these variables appear to be correlated with the
level of utilisation (but not with changes).
12 See Imbens (2003) for a survey.
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grants. Finally, we need to take account of increased demand for public services,
which may result from the allocation of health cards.
To control for the first stage allocation process we include district fixed
effects. These capture any between district variation in allocation of health cards and
SSN funding. BKKBN poverty estimates for sub-districts control for allocation of
subsidy within districts and the number of health cards issued in the areas covered by
the facilities. Thus, we are matching households who live in areas that enjoy/suffer
similar program intensity and similar supply shocks in health care.
At the village level we include variables from the Podes that reflect pre-
program access to health care. These include the number of public health clinics,
auxiliary health clinics and maternity facilities in the village, dummy variables
indicating whether the majority of village traffic is by land, and a dummy variable
reflecting the village leaders’ opinion about the accessibility of health clinics. As local
facility staff distributes the health cards, we include the number of doctors and village
midwifes living in the village (per 1000 inhabitants) as a proxy for informal contacts
within the village. Finally, the level of education of the village leader is included, as
well as dummy variables indicating IDT eligibility and whether the village is located
in a rural area.13
For households we include the five BKKBN allocation criteria as dummy
variables. Other household welfare variables refer to housing characteristics (status of
house occupied, type of roof, walls and floor, sewage, sanitation and drinking water
facilities, and source of light), sector of main source of household income, and
employment status of the head of household. We further control for household
composition (gender and age), household size and head of household characteristics
(gender and education level). Per capita consumption is endogenous since a health
card reduces health care expenses, and is therefore omitted. A household with a health
card would, on average, report a lower consumption level than it would if it had not
received a health card.14 If we add household expenditure to the propensity score
function we would be constructing a control group that is less wealthy than the
intervention group. Consequently, we would overestimate the health card effect.
                                                
13 IDT refers to the Inpres Desa Tertinggal program, an anti-poverty program for economic less
developed villages.
14 See van de Walle (2003) for a discussion on assumptions about behavioural responses regarding the
effect of public policy on household consumption.
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We estimated the propensity score function separately for five main regions in
Indonesia.15 In this way we restricted the match to households living in the same
region. A household with a health card living in Java could for instance, never be
matched with a household without a health card living in Sumatra. The reason for
doing so is that we believe that there are unobserved characteristics which vary by
region that influence the effect that other variables have on the probability of
receiving a health card. The Pseudo R-squared for the regional models ranged from
0.12 to 0.26.16
Households that own a health card are matched to households without a health
card, based on the estimated propensity score. There is a variety of matching methods
that can be applied (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens,
2003). We implemented nearest neighbour matching, the simplest matching
procedure. For each household in the treatment group we selected a control-household
with the nearest value of the propensity score. This way of constructing a control
group basically boils down to re-weighing the potential control group. Those
households that are not matched receive a weight of zero, those who are matched once
receive a weight of one, and those matched more than once receive a weight higher
than one. The choice between allowing matching with replacement or without
involves the trade-off between increasing precision and reducing the bias. Matching
with replacement will give the least biased estimate, but reduces precision of the
estimate, as the weights for multiple matched observations increase the variance. The
drawback of matching without replacement is that it yields a shortage of possible
matches for those households with a high propensity score. We used the rule that
when the match obtained without replacement had a propensity score that differed
more than 0.001 from the propensity score of the household in the treatment group,
we resorted to matching with replacement. If no match was found within a radius of
0.001 we did not match the household to a control.
The quality of match is best illustrated using a graph. Figure 2 graphs the
distribution of the propensity score for the matched households in a histogram, while
Table 7 depicts the distribution of the propensity score for the intervention group,
potential controls and households matched more than once. The number of matched
                                                
15 The 5 regions we define are (i) Java and Bali, (ii) Sumatra, (iii) Sulawesi, (iv) Kalimantan and (v)
Other Islands.
16 The estimation results for the propensity score function are available upon request from the authors.
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household’s decreases as the probability of selection increases. The region of
overlapping support ranges from 0.0008 to 0.8473. Households outside this range are
not considered in the matching procedure.
The matched households are very similar on the basis of the individual
observed characteristics, which entered into the matching function. This is evident
from Table 4, where column 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics for the matched
samples, and columns 4 and 5 show the difference in means of the covariates. The top
panel presents variables that were included in the matching function, and shows that
the two samples are well balanced across the observed characteristics. The second
panel shows that the district dummy variables managed to control for the supply
shock in the matching process. Both program intensity variables are balanced for the
matched households, while they differ strongly for the non-matched households.
The differential impact of ownership of a health card is estimated by
comparing utilisation patterns of the treatment and matched control group. Comparing
means yields the average impact of the pure health card intervention on health card
owners. It can easily be obtained by estimating the regression
(3) iii HCY εβδ ++=
on the matched sample applying sample weights. βˆ  is an unbiased estimate of the
pure treatment effect for those who are selected into the program,
( )[ ] ( )[ ]jjijijjiji SSNqhSSNYESSNqhSSNYE ==−== ,1|,0,1|,1  in equation (2).
The pure health card effect is then βˆpˆ , where pˆ  is the estimated probability of
selection into the program ( pˆ = Pr(hi = 1) ).
The overall impact of the program, as defined in equation (1), is obtained by
exploiting regional variation in the financial compensation for the health card program
to public health care providers. We assume that the increase in funding will capture
the combined direct and indirect effects. Later in the paper we evaluate the robustness
of this approach. To measure the variation in SSN compensation we use
administrative data concerning the 1998/1999 budget that was allocated for transfers
to public health facilities. The variation was substantial. For example, we found that
the amount of compensation, weighted by the district population size, in Sulawesi is
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29 percent higher than in Sumatra and 34 percent higher that in Java/Bali, but about
half of what is allocated to the smaller islands (Table 8).
We model the effect of the general increase in funding as a linear function of
the budget allocation. For district j, in time period t, the utilisation of health services is
written as
(4) jtjt
jt
jt
r
trrtjjt WN
SSN
dddY εφγθθα +++++= ∑
=
'
5
2
0
where SSNj is the amount of compensation for public health clinics allocated to
district j, Nj denotes the district population size. Subscript t indicates time and refers
to either the time period before the intervention (1998) or the time period after the
intervention (1999).  We include a time dummy variable, taking value dt = 0 if t =
1998 or dt = 1 if t = 1999. The time variable has been interacted with 5 region specific
fixed effects, dr, in order to allow for some flexibility in capturing the time effect.17 In
the pre-intervention year SSNj equals zero for all districts. We also add a set of
regional welfare and demographic characteristics, Wjt, to the model. These include the
poverty profile of the districts18, the average age and household size, the district
population size, and the fraction of the population living in a rural area. Frankenberg
et al. (2003) show evidence of changes in household size, migration between urban
and rural areas due to households restructuring their composition in response to the
crisis. While the average household size increased in (lower cost) rural areas, the
number of working age family members increased in urban households.
The non-random allocation of the SSN budget is accounted for by a district
fixed effect, αj. This removes any bias due to unobserved time invariant factors that
affect geographic allocation and are also correlated with health care utilisation. The
fact that the SSN budget allocation was determined by static pre-program poverty
estimates, the BBKBN classification, and not on the basis of dynamic changes in
poverty legitimises the fixed effects approach.
Taking differences across districts over time gives
                                                
17 Java and Bali (region 1) are used as reference group.
18 The poverty profile is portrayed by the poverty rate (P0) and poverty gap (P1), with
∑ = −−= qi plicnP 1 )/1(1 αα , where pl is the poverty line and q the number of individuals for which ci
≤ pl (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984).
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Estimating (5) by OLS yields unbiased estimates under the assumption that the
allocation of SSN funds is not correlated with time variant unobservables. If the
geographic allocation is correlated with important district-level trends that are not
captured by the time dummies or ∆Wjt, then OLS estimates may still be biased. This is
not very likely, given that the BKKBN indices are badly suited for capturing the
changes in welfare. Further reassurance is given by the fact that we find no correlation
between SSN allocation (per capita) and changes in utilisation from 1998 to 1997.
The overall impact of the program is then obtained by taking a population
weighted average of the effects for the districts
(6) SSN
N
N
N
SSNJ
j
j
j
j γγ ˆˆ
1
=∑
=
where SSN is the average financial compensation for the health card program per
person across the country, and J the number of districts.
The estimated impact of the supply impulse on the utilisation of outpatient
services (i.e., the indirect effect) is given by the difference between the estimate of the
average total effect and the average pure health card. Inserting (6) and the estimate of
β  in (3) into (2) yields an expression for the impact of the general budget increase for
public service providers
(7) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] βγ ˆˆˆ|0,0|,0 pSSNSSNqYESSNqSSNYE jjijjji −==−=
5. Results
The estimation results of the pure health card effect on outpatient utilisation for health
card owners )ˆ(β  and the average pure effect )ˆˆ( βp , are given in Table 9. The
estimate of pˆ  is simply the fraction of individuals living in a household that owns a
health card. The table also shows contact rates for outpatient services for the matched
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intervention and control groups, and the percentage change relative to the
counterfactual. The effects are estimated for reported utilisation over a one-month
reference period.19
Health card ownership resulted in a relative increase in the use of outpatient
services of 9.1 percent, and an absolute increase of 1 percentage point. This increase
was due to an increase in utilisation from the poorest four quintiles, while for the
richer quintile we only observe a substitution effect from private to public health care
providers. The highest increase, relative to the base, is seen for the third quintile (16.8
percent), followed by the poorest group (14.2). For all income groups health card
ownership resulted in an increase in the use of public sector services and a decrease in
the use of private sector services. For the richest quintile the two effects cancelled out,
as we see a small, statistically not significant, increase in overall utilisation. The shift
from private to public care seems to have occurred in both urban and rural areas. The
health card program affected utilisation amongst women more than it did amongst
men, possibly because of the maternity services covered under the health card
program. Both the overall increase in outpatient visits and the substitution effect from
private to public were larger for women.
Table 11 presents the estimates of γ  from equation (5), and the estimates of
the overall effect of the program )ˆ( SSNγ , defined in equation (6). These estimates are
also based on a one-month reference period. The results indicate an absolute increase
in the use of public sector services of 0.5 percentage point, while the program does
not affect the use of private sector services. We find that the effect is larger for the
wealthier quintiles. For the first and third quintiles the estimates are small and not
significant. As with the pure health card effect, the overall effect of the program on
public services is larger for females than for males. The program had the largest
impact on the use of public care in rural areas, while for urban areas the estimates are
not precise. Since private care seems unaffected, we find similar results for the overall
effect on utilisation.
The indirect effect, which could be attributed to an overall supply or quality
impulse as a result of the extra budget support in the public sector, seems to have been
                                                
19 Each year the Core of the Susenas collects utilisation using a one-month reference period. We also
estimated the effects based on a three months reference period, which was used in the 1999 SSN
module. However, these data may partly reflect pre-intervention outcomes, so we need to be careful
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a main contributor to the increase in the use of public health care services. Combining
the estimates in Table 11 with those referring to the one month reference period in
Table 9 allows us to investigate what share of the increase in the use of public sector
services is due to the indirect effect (as defined in equation (7)), and to the pure health
card effect. The share of the indirect effect to the total effect is given by
( ))ˆ/()ˆˆ(1 SSNp γβ− . About 80 percent of the overall increase in utilisation is a result of
the indirect effect. In the public sector about half of the total increase can be attributed
to the indirect effect of the budget increase. The results also suggest that the indirect
benefits of the program increase with income. For the richest quintile only 7 percent
of the increased utilisation of public care can be attributed to the health card itself,
while for the poor there is no evidence of any indirect effect. Finally, the supply
impulse had an above average effect in rural areas, emphasising the shortage of
resources with rural public health care providers.
So can the revival of the public sector utilisation be attributed to the Social
Safety Net Program? It appears to be. The estimates reported in Table 11 can be used
to estimate the utilisation if the health card program had not existed. From (6) it
shows that the impact on overall utilisation is the estimate of γ times the average
compensation to health care providers ( SSN ). The results indicate that health card
program increased outpatient contact rate by 0.55 percentage point and the contact
rate at public facilities by 0.47 percentage point. In Table 1, where we reported the
trends in health care utilisation, we added the counterfactual of what would have been
public and private sector utilisation in absence of the health card program. From 1998
to 1999 the contact rate for public sector services increased from 5.0 to 5.3 percent,
while the contact rate for modern health care providers remained stable at 10.5
percent. The estimates suggest that without the health card program public sector
utilisation would have dropped further to 4.9 percent, and the overall contact rate
would have dropped to 10.0 percent.
                                                                                                                                           
interpreting these results. Nevertheless, the estimates show a similar impact as the one-month recall
period. These results are available upon request from the authors.
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6. Caveats and sensitivity analysis
Crowding out
The main assumption underlying our study is that utilisation of health card owners is
independent from that of non-health card households. This implies that the number of
health card recipients (i.e., the program intensity) in the region does not affect
utilisation of care for non-recipients. However, if health care supply would be
inelastic, then distributing health cards could lead to a crowding out effect. Resources
would be redistributed from non-recipients to health card recipients. In this case the
estimated direct effect of the health card will be biased upward. The difference in
utilisation would consist of the “true” health card effect and the crowding out effect.
One might argue that the crowding out effect is likely to be small. Since health
card coverage is 11 percent and concentrated among the poor whose health care
demand is typically low, it is unlikely that the program would seriously strain the
capacity of health care facilities. We can test this argument by controlling for health
card intensity when we estimate the direct effect, by including the average number of
health cards distributed in the district. We also include the sub-district allocation
criteria and village level characteristics to capture program intensity at lower
administrative levels. If the estimated direct effect is indeed biased upward by
crowding out effects then we would expect the results to be sensitive to these control
variables.
The results in Table 10 suggest that the estimated direct effect is not biased
due to crowding out effects. Specification (1) controls for a set of individual and
households characteristics, IDT village and rural area dummies, and the availability of
health facilities in the village. Specification (2) adds the sub-district BKKBN index,
program intensity at district level, and the poverty profile (P0, P1). The fraction of the
population with a health card and the SSN budget per capita allocated to the districts
reflect program intensity. The estimated effects do not change much, and remain
within one standard deviation from the estimates in Table 9.
Interaction effects
It is possible that the benefits of the health cards depend on the size of the SSN grants
allocated to an area. The quality of care provided to health card owners may well
increase with the financial compensation. So far we have ignored interaction effects
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between the health card program and the SSN budgetary support. The district dummy
variables included in the matching functions do capture program intensity and the
supply shock induced by the SSN budget. Moreover, our estimation method allows
for unobserved effect heterogeneity due to regional variation in SSN intensity, since
we simply average the estimated impact for all the households with a health card.
Nevertheless, we can investigate whether our estimates are sensitive to these
interaction effects.
Another interaction effect, related to crowding out, occurs when the benefits of
a health card decrease if the pressure of the health card program increases in a region.
If this is the case, we expect a negative interaction effect.
Specification (3) in Table 10 includes interaction terms of the health card with
the two program intensity indicators. Our estimates seem not to be affected by the
interaction effects. The point estimate for the direct health card effect on overall
utilisation is slightly larger, but still within one standard deviation. The substitution
effect between public and private is also slightly larger than in Table 9. The
interaction effects are not statistically significant.
Selection on health status
A third problem, and potentially more serious, is that we have not taken
account of the possibility that households may have been selected based on health
status. Those with poor health may have received a health card because of their higher
anticipated need while other – otherwise similar – persons did not receive one.
Officially health cards should have been distributed based on BKKBN criteria but
health status could well have played a role in the actual distribution. If this is true, not
including a measure of health status in the matching function will result in an
intervention group with a worse health status than the control group. Poor health will,
ceteris paribus, increase the demand for health care. The resulting impact estimate
will be larger or equal to the true effect.
The only measure of health status the Susenas collects is self-reported illness.
However, including self-reported illness in the matching function would likely have
resulted in an underestimate of the true health card effect. The evidence indicates that
self-reported illness depends on the affordability of care. We find that the rich report
more often ill compared to the poor, which is surely not a result of the rich having a
worse health status than the poor. If self-reported illness indeed depends on the
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affordability of health care, and health care is more affordable for those who own a
healthcard, then matching on self reported illness will result in a control group with
worse health status than the intervention group. Better health will, ceteris paribus,
decrease the demand for primary health care. Hence our impact estimate would have
been an underestimate.
The two impact estimates, obtained without and with including self-reported
illness in the matching function, can give us some notion on the extent of the bias.
The health card effect should lie between the estimate that does control for self-
reported illness (lower bound) and that which does not (upper bound). The results
suggest that our estimates and conclusions are not sensitive to systematic differences
in health status, since the estimated bounds lie close to each other. We included a
dummy variable that indicated whether a health complaint has disrupted work, school
or daily activities for any member of the household during the last month in the
matching function. Specification (4) in Table 10 gives the results for a one-month
reference period. Comparing it with Table 9, we see that the estimate for all outpatient
care decreases slightly, from 0.0101 to 0.0081. The point estimates are within one
standard deviation. This leads to an upper- and lower bound for the direct effect of
0.11 to 0.09 percentage point, respectively. The difference comes from the change in
demand for public care. The estimated effect for private care remains unchanged.
Total effect
Does the SSN budget allocation identify the combined effect of the increased funding
and the allocation of health cards, as we defined it in equation (1)? It could be, for
example, that there are districts with a high SSN allocation but with a delay in health
card distribution at the time of the survey. Does the variation in SSN budget then
adequately capture the total effect?  To investigate this we added health card coverage
to the model, as well as an interaction term with the SSN variable. If the budget
allocation does not identify the total effect, we expect the results to be sensitive to the
new variables.
Note that health card allocation data is likely to be endogenous. Unlike the
SSN budget, it is not administrative data driven by pre-program welfare indicators. It
reflects the actual allocation of health cards, which depends on district specific
infrastructure, organisation and welfare characteristics, and is likely to be correlated
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with the heterogeneous effects of the crisis. Therefore, we use the BKKBN indices
from December 1997 as instruments for health card allocation.20
The results are given in Table 12 and suggest that our original estimates are
fairly robust and capture the combined effect of the program. When we add health
card penetration, the coefficients for the SSN grants are a slightly larger and a little
less precise. Neither the coefficient of the health card variable or that of the
interaction term is significant.
7. Conclusion
This paper presented an impact evaluation of the health card program as it operated
under the Social Safety Net in its very first months. It shows that in many ways the
program was a success. In other ways the program has achieved things which may not
have been the objective at the outset. The health card program has a weak link
between the delivery of services to health card owners and the financial
compensation. Service providers were reimbursed using a lump sum transfer based on
the number of health cards distributed to their area of influence. As a result, serving a
health card owner did not result in a direct financial reward to the service provider.
This makes the health card program a rather particular case of a targeted price subsidy
scheme.
The particular design resulted in a weak link between health card ownership
and utilisation. We find that often health card owners did not use their health card
when obtaining care from public service providers. Also we find instances in which a
patient reports the use of the health card while the head of the household reports not to
own a health card. It seems like several factors are at play. High rejection rates could
follow from the delays in the lump sum transfers made to the providers. The second
case could arise if service providers distribute health cards when the patients show up
to ask for services.
There is clear evidence that the health card program was pro-poor in the sense
that the poor had a higher probability of receiving a health card and if they received a
health card, they increased the use of health services presumably making them
                                                
20 We use the indices for the two poorest BKKBN classifications (pre-prosperous and KS1).
Households ranked in one of these groups are eligible for a health card. The instruments are not
correlated with the pre-crisis trend. An over-identifying restrictions test further validates the
instruments. Detailed results are available upon request from the authors.
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healthier. However, there is considerable leakage to the richer quintiles, and
utilisation of services is less pro-poor than ownership. Conditional on ownership, the
rich have a higher propensity to use their health card.
Returning to the questions we started out with, we found that for all
households health card ownership resulted in a large substitution effect away from the
private sector to the public sector, with a net increase in the overall use of outpatient
medical services. A dynamic analysis further indicates that the combined SSN
program resulted in an increase of the outpatient contact rate at modern health care
providers of 0.55 percentage point. In the event the program would not have existed
outpatient utilisation would have further fallen in 1999. However, the increased
utilisation due to the direct health card effect only contributes about 20 percent to that.
A considerable proportion of the impact of the program seems to have been through
the budgetary support for public services. If this is true, the comeback of the public
sector in the provision of outpatient care can be attributed for a large part to the
supply impulse induced by the increased spending under the SSN health program.
However, the effects of both the direct health card and the supply impulse
show a strong heterogeneous pattern across sub groups of the population. While the
targeting and impact of the pure health card program is pro-poor, the total effect is
not. The poor are responsive to a price subsidy but not to a supply impulse. The health
card increased utilisation and led to a substitution effect from private to subsidised
public care. For the non-poor, however, utilisation seems to be mainly supply driven,
as the health card only affected their choice of health care provider without increasing
utilisation.
The impact of the program has suffered from the weak link between
reimbursements for public service providers and utilisation of the health card. Those
in the poorest quintile did only benefit from the program if they received a health
card, as the results indicate that they did not benefit from the supply impulse. In the
end, the non-poor captured most of the benefits of the overall program. This
emphasises that in absence of clear incentive mechanisms for health care providers,
general increases in public spending are relatively ineffective in reaching the poor. A
stronger link between provision of services and budget would likely have improved
the targeting to the poor.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 Changes in outpatient contact rates for public and private care, 1995 to 1999 (percentage of
population that visited provider at least once in previous month)
Provider 1995 1997 1998 1999 1999
without SSN
Public 7.00 6.65 5.03 5.34 4.87
[0.083] [0.085] [0.062] [0.071]
Private 6.48 6.71 6.11 5.80 5.67
[0.073] [0.079] [0.070] [0.078]
Modern (public or private) a 12.83 12.83 10.48 10.53 9.98
[0.111] [0.118] [0.098] [0.110]
Nr. of observations 873,647 887,266 880,040 864,580
Note: Standard errors in square brackets.
a)  The contact rate for all modern care is smaller than the sum of the contact rates for public and private
care since individuals who sought both public and private care are counted only once in the aggregate.
Table 2 Changes in outpatient contact rates, 1995 to 1999, by type of provider
Provider 1995 1997 1998 1999
Public hospital 0.64 0.60 0.64 0.59
[0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019]
Private hospital 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39
[0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.018]
Private doctor 3.01 3.14 2.84 2.63
[0.050] [0.053] [0.044] [0.052]
Primary health centre (Puskesmas) 4.66 4.31 3.25 3.46
[0.065] [0.069] [0.049] [0.057]
Subsidiary health centre  (Puskesmas Pembantu) 1.69 1.66 1.01 1.01
[0.046] [0.044] [0.031] [0.032]
Private clinic 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.31
[0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.016]
Integrated health centre (Posyandu) 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.10
[0.009] [0.011] [0.008] [0.007]
Village maternity room (Polindes) 0.38 0.24 0.26 0.40
[0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015]
Paramedical practitioner (Petugas) 2.82 2.93 2.80 2.70
[0.048] [0.052] [0.048] [0.049]
Traditional care 0.73 0.63 0.43 0.40
[0.020] [0.018] [0.014] [0.015]
Nr. of observations 873,647 887,266 880,040 864,580
Note: Standard errors in square brackets.
Table 3 Percentage of Indonesians living in households owning a
health card, by per capita consumption quintile
Percentage
Quintile 1 (poor) 18.45
Quintile 2 13.71
Quintile 3 10.61
Quintile 4 7.09
Quintile 5 (rich) 3.71
Indonesia 10.62
Number of observations 822,607
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for households with and without a health card, and for matched pairs
All households Matched pairs
Variable No health
card
Health
card
No health
card a
Health
card
Diff. [s.e]
Propensity score 0.0823 0.2488 0.2433 0.2433 -0.0000 0.0018
Female head of household 0.1268 0.1608 0.1618 0.1601 -0.0017 0.0038
Education head of household
No education completed 0.3641 0.5087 0.5090 0.5073 -0.0017 0.0052
Primary 0.2985 0.3324 0.3289 0.3327 0.0038 0.0049
Junior secondary 0.1220 0.0814 0.0818 0.0818 0.0000 0.0028
Senior secondary 0.1689 0.0667 0.0693 0.0674 -0.0019 0.0026
Higher 0.0465 0.0107 0.0111 0.0108 -0.0003 0.0011
Head of household unemployed 0.0079 0.0074 0.0075 0.0074 -0.0001 0.0009
Household size 4.2043 4.2576 4.2211 4.2449 0.0238 0.0189
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.9343 0.8894 0.8911 0.8902 -0.0010 0.0032
Food 0.9835 0.9778 0.9785 0.9790 0.0004 0.0015
Clothing 0.9645 0.9473 0.9487 0.9487 0.0000 0.0023
Floor 0.8193 0.5935 0.5962 0.5954 -0.0008 0.0051
Health 0.8899 0.9061 0.9056 0.9057 0.0001 0.0030
Main source of household income
Agriculture, farming 0.4551 0.5568 0.5526 0.5546 0.0020 0.0051
Mining, quarrying 0.0097 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 -0.0001 0.0010
Processing industry 0.0687 0.0685 0.0655 0.0682 0.0027 0.0026
Electricity, gas, water 0.0022 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0003
Construction 0.0400 0.0494 0.0507 0.0496 -0.0011 0.0023
Trade 0.1482 0.1180 0.1206 0.1193 -0.0013 0.0034
Transport., storage, comm. 0.0510 0.0519 0.0522 0.0521 -0.0002 0.0023
Finance, insurance, real estate 0.0091 0.0031 0.0026 0.0031 0.0005 0.0006
Services 0.1462 0.0931 0.0957 0.0936 -0.0021 0.0030
Other 0.0028 0.0037 0.0033 0.0036 0.0004 0.0006
Income recipient 0.0672 0.0459 0.0470 0.0464 -0.0006 0.0022
Rural area 0.6792 0.7880 0.7856 0.7862 0.0006 0.0042
IDT village 0.2822 0.3495 0.3476 0.3444 -0.0032 0.0049
BKKBN rate per sub-district 0.3088 0.4407 0.4417 0.4390 -0.0028 0.0026
Program intensity at district level
SSN budget per capita 1.6164 1.8178 1.8154 1.8147 -0.0007 0.0099
Health card coverage 0.0886 0.1885 0.1865 0.1870 0.0004 0.0012
Endogenous variables
Member of household ill 0.3110 0.3620 0.3293 0.3605 0.0312 0.0049
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.1523 0.2838 0.2415 0.2798 0.0383 0.0045
Quintile 2 0.1686 0.2385 0.2279 0.2392 0.0112 0.0044
Quintile 3 0.1930 0.2101 0.2089 0.2114 0.0025 0.0042
Quintile 4 0.2206 0.1659 0.1811 0.1671 -0.0141 0.0039
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.2655 0.1018 0.1405 0.1026 -0.0379 0.0034
Number of observations 173,366 18,993 18,727 18,727
a) Includes 406 households that are matched more than once.
Table 5 Utilisation of health card (percent that sought care in past three months)
Head of household reports to have
received a health card
Head of household reports not to
have received a health card
Received outpatient care 15.10 12.91
Went to public provider 10.36 6.55
- Used health card 6.63 0.14
- Did not use health card 3.73 6.41
Went to private provider 4.74 6.36
Number of observations 81,126 741,481
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Table 6 Type of expenses for which SSN transfers to health clinics have been used (as
percentage of total SSN health program transfers)
Public health clinic Village midwife
Urban Rural Indonesia Urban Rural Indonesia
Medicine procurement 37.64 43.21 41.40 39.09 38.36 38.44
Medical disposables 14.29 11.56 12.45 16.31 16.49 16.47
Food for in-patients 2.57 1.87 2.10
Transport costs for referral 5.75 6.75 6.43 3.73 4.09 4.05
other transport expenses 22.38 20.51 20.72
Birth aids by village midwife 17.05 17.95 17.65
Contraceptive tools 2.01 3.13 3.01
Tax to Pemda 1.42 1.49 1.47
Honorarium 2.23 2.04 2.10
Other 19.05 15.13 16.40 16.48 17.40 17.30
Number of clinics 1,319 2,411 3,730 404 3,242 3,646
Source: 1999 Social Safety Net survey – public health centres (Puskesmas) and village midwives
(Bidan di desa)
Table 7 Distribution of propensity score for all households and for the matched pairs
All households Matched pairs
Propensity
score
No health card Health card No health card Health card
Nr. of households in
control group matched
more than once
0.0 – 0.1 128,128 4,658 4,658 4,658 0
0.1 – 0.2 26,544 4,405 4,406 4,405 0
0.2 – 0.3 10,003 3,388 3,386 3,387 3
0.3 – 0.4 4,828 2,605 2,589 2,588 21
0.4 – 0.5 2,318 1,839 1,788 1,794 68
0.5 – 0.6 1,105 1,238 1,208 1,203 161
0.6 – 0.7 378 664 620 620 137
0.7 – 0.8 57 177 72 72 16
0.8 – 0.9 5 19 0 0 0
Total 173,366 18,993 18,727 18,727 406
Note: Range of common support:  [0.0008, 0.8473]
Table 8 SSN budget allocation to public health care providers, 1998/1999 (1000’ Rupiah)
Region Total budget Puskesmas
and village midwife
Population size a Budget per
capita
Health card
coverage
Number of
districts
Java Bali 158,524,734 123,646,893 1.282 0.139 117
Sumatra 57,686,076 43,396,301 1.329 0.072 73
Sulawesi 25,009,892 14,553,660 1.718 0.049 40
Kalimantan 15,747,384 11,210,671 1.405 0.052 29
Other islands 36,024,406 11,860,142 3.037 0.085 34
Indonesia 292,992,492 204,667,667 1.432 0.106 293
Source: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Indonesia
a) Based on Susenas weights.
32
Table 9 Impact of health card ownership on utilisation of outpatient services (pure health card effect, 1month reference period)
Outpatient care Intervention group Control group Difference
( βˆ )
[s.e.]a % Change Direct effect
( βˆpˆ )
pˆ N treated N control
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0993 0.0869 0.0123 [0.0032] 14.2 0.0023 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.1206 0.1080 0.0126 [0.0040] 11.7 0.0017 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.1333 0.1142 0.0191 [0.0045] 16.8 0.0020 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.1453 0.1292 0.0161 [0.0055] 12.4 0.0011 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1510 0.1451 0.0059 [0.0079] 4.0 0.0002 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.1158 0.1069 0.0089 [0.0030] 8.3 0.0009 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.1270 0.1157 0.0113 [0.0029] 9.8 0.0012 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.1392 0.1281 0.0110 [0.0051] 8.6 0.0008 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.1149 0.1061 0.0088 [0.0021] 8.3 0.0011 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.1215 0.1113 0.0101 [0.0020] 9.1 0.0011 0.106 76,903 73,986
Public
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0729 0.0542 0.0187 [0.0026] 34.6 0.0035 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.0784 0.0585 0.0200 [0.0032] 34.1 0.0027 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.0859 0.0575 0.0284 [0.0033] 49.3 0.0030 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.0916 0.0627 0.0289 [0.0043] 46.1 0.0020 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0841 0.0590 0.0251 [0.0057] 42.5 0.0009 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.0734 0.0537 0.0197 [0.0021] 36.8 0.0021 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.0871 0.0622 0.0249 [0.0022] 40.1 0.0027 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.0869 0.0628 0.0241 [0.0034] 38.3 0.0017 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.0779 0.0565 0.0214 [0.0017] 38.0 0.0027 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.0804 0.0580 0.0224 [0.0015] 38.6 0.0024 0.106 76,903 73,986
Private
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0305 0.0371 -0.0066 [0.0022] -17.7 -0.0012 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.0497 0.0547 -0.0051 [0.0030] -9.3 -0.0007 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.0571 0.0641 -0.0070 [0.0036] -11.0 -0.0007 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.0655 0.0765 -0.0110 [0.0041] -14.4 -0.0008 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0803 0.0983 -0.0179 [0.0068] -18.2 -0.0007 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.0501 0.0601 -0.0100 [0.0023] -16.6 -0.0010 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.0477 0.0606 -0.0129 [0.0021] -21.3 -0.0014 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.0613 0.0726 -0.0113 [0.0041] -15.5 -0.0008 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.0442 0.0565 -0.0123 [0.0015] -21.7 -0.0016 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.0489 0.0604 -0.0115 [0.0015] -19.0 -0.0012 0.106 76,903 73,986
a)  Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
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Table 10 Sensitivity direct effect estimate (1 month reference period)
Outpatient care (1) a (2) a (3) a (4) b
Health card 0.0103 0.0109 0.0106 0.0081
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0052] [0.0020]
SSN per capita in district 0.0126 0.0112
[0.0016] [0.0020]
Health card coverage in district 0.1059 0.1195
[0.0109] [0.0146]
Health card * SSN per capita 0.0034
[0.0025]
Health card * Health card coverage -0.0289
[0.0188]
Public
Health card 0.0224 0.0235 0.0272 0.0201
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0038] [0.0016]
SSN per capita in district 0.0119 0.0125
[0.0012] [0.0015]
Health card coverage in district 0.0470 0.0507
[0.0077] [0.0114]
Health card * SSN per capita -0.0015
[0.0019]
Health card * Health card coverage -0.0059
[0.0137]
Private
Health card -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0140 -0.0117
[0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0038] [0.0015]
SSN per capita in district 0.0014 -0.0000
[0.0012] [0.0014]
Health card coverage in district 0.0693 0.0760
[0.0082] [0.0101]
Health card * SSN per capita 0.0035
[0.0019]
Health card * Health card coverage -0.0161
[0.0140]
Number of observations 150,889 150,889 150,889 151,219
Note: Detailed estimation results are available upon request from the authors.
a)  Probit marginal effects. The sample concerns the same set of individuals from matched households
as in Table 9. The coefficients of other covariates are omitted for convenience. All specifications
include age, gender, characteristics head of household (gender, education), household size, BKKBN
prosperity status, main source of income (agriculture/no agriculture), village status (rural, IDT), and
availability of health providers in the village/township. Specification (2) and (3) also include sub-
district BKKBN index, and district poverty profile (P0, P1).
b)  Sensitivity to selection on needs bias. The propensity score function includes a dummy variable that
indicates whether a health complaint has disrupted work, school or daily activities of a household
member. N – treated = 76,956, N – control = 74,263. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500
replications.
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Table 11 Overall effect of SSN interventions (1 month reference period)
All outpatient visits coefficient
)ˆ(γ
[s.e.] Overall effect a
)ˆ( SSNγ
Number of
districts
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0039 [0.0041] 0.0056 290
Quintile 2 0.0073 [0.0038] 0.0105 293
Quintile 3 0.0012 [0.0029] 0.0017 293
Quintile 4 0.0065 [0.0032] 0.0093 293
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0075 [0.0036] 0.0108 293
Male 0.0037 [0.0022] 0.0053 293
Female 0.0040 [0.0024] 0.0058 293
Urban 0.0045 [0.0048] 0.0064 286
Rural 0.0060 [0.0028] 0.0086 276
All 0.0039 [0.0022] 0.0055 293
Outpatient public
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0035 [0.0033] 0.0049 290
Quintile 2 0.0080 [0.0033] 0.0115 293
Quintile 3 -0.0001 [0.0022] -0.0001 293
Quintile 4 0.0059 [0.0023] 0.0085 293
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0094 [0.0023] 0.0134 293
Male 0.0026 [0.0014] 0.0037 293
Female 0.0040 [0.0017] 0.0057 293
Urban 0.0016 [0.0032] 0.0023 286
Rural 0.0053 [0.0020] 0.0076 276
All 0.0033 [0.0015] 0.0047 293
Outpatient private
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0020 [0.0025] 0.0028 290
Quintile 2 -0.0002 [0.0018] -0.0003 293
Quintile 3 0.0016 [0.0017] 0.0023 293
Quintile 4 0.0004 [0.0020] 0.0006 293
Quintile 5 (rich) -0.0016 [0.0028] -0.0023 293
Male 0.0012 [0.0014] 0.0017 293
Female 0.0005 [0.0014] 0.0008 293
Urban 0.0031 [0.0031] 0.0045 286
Rural 0.0013 [0.0017] 0.0019 276
All 0.0009 [0.0013] 0.0013 293
Note: Detailed estimation results are available upon request from the authors.
a)  SSN = 1.432 (see Table 8)
Table 12 Sensitivity total effect estimate (IV)
(1) (2)
All outpatient visits coefficient [s.e.] coefficient [s.e.]
SSN per capita in district 0.0042 [0.0028] 0.0044 [0.0032]
Health card coverage in district -0.0118 [0.0628]
SSN*HC -0.0054 [0.0244]
Outpatient public
SSN per capita in district 0.0037 [0.0019] 0.0039 [0.0022]
Health card coverage in district -0.0159 [0.0421]
SSN*HC -0.0060 [0.0163]
Outpatient private
SSN per capita in district 0.0007 [0.0017] 0.0007 [0.0020]
Health card coverage in district 0.0081 [0.0381]
SSN*HC 0.0020 [0.0148]
Instrumented Health card coverage SSN*HC
Note: BKKBN pre-prosperous and KS1 indices for December 1997 are used as instruments. Detailed
estimation results are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1 Concentration curve for ownership and use of Healthcard to obtain benefits associated with
outpatient treatment
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Figure 2 Histogram of the propensity score for matched households (bin size = 0.02)
iAppendix – Supplementary tables
Table A - 1 Propensity score estimations (logit), by region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Java/Bali Sumatra Sulawesi Kalimantan Other
islands
Female head of household 0.351** 0.351** 0.268* 0.694** -0.101
[0.042] [0.076] [0.116] [0.146] [0.112]
Education head of household
(ref. : not completed primary school)
Primary -0.133** -0.091+ 0.008 0.010 0.091
[0.027] [0.050] [0.077] [0.091] [0.067]
Junior secondary -0.326** -0.240** -0.179 -0.208 0.026
[0.046] [0.069] [0.113] [0.148] [0.104]
Senior secondary -0.706** -0.474** -0.312** -0.110 -0.089
[0.054] [0.079] [0.120] [0.160] [0.108]
Higher -1.107** -0.735** -0.438+ -0.768+ -0.160
[0.115] [0.171] [0.258] [0.417] [0.207]
Head of household unemployed 0.275* 0.277 0.111 -0.274 -0.370
[0.115] [0.264] [0.423] [0.741] [0.399]
Log household size 0.313** 0.360** 0.284** 0.314** 0.287**
[0.033] [0.059] [0.091] [0.110] [0.080]
Household composition
(ref. : share of males age 18-60)
Share of males age < 18 0.533** 0.296+ 0.178 0.443 0.779**
[0.088] [0.158] [0.248] [0.293] [0.221]
Share of females age < 18 0.567** 0.205 -0.100 0.357 0.705**
[0.089] [0.160] [0.257] [0.298] [0.225]
Share of females age 18-60 0.299** 0.185 0.337 -0.231 0.560*
[0.097] [0.184] [0.278] [0.330] [0.256]
Share of males age > 60 0.419** 0.328 0.159 1.302** 0.537*
[0.094] [0.213] [0.320] [0.347] [0.272]
Share of females age > 60 0.362** 0.321 0.677* 0.668+ 0.810**
[0.097] [0.205] [0.308] [0.351] [0.303]
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.000 -0.176* -0.053 0.051 0.603**
[0.037] [0.085] [0.105] [0.143] [0.177]
Food -0.278** -0.264+ 0.174 -0.528* -0.183
[0.096] [0.151] [0.246] [0.211] [0.119]
Clothing -0.178** -0.372** -0.620** -0.753** 0.241*
[0.057] [0.107] [0.159] [0.164] [0.100]
Floor -0.201** -0.064 -0.091 -0.676** 0.066
[0.041] [0.075] [0.125] [0.163] [0.089]
Health 0.237** 0.367** 0.677** 0.274* 0.321**
[0.040] [0.075] [0.114] [0.131] [0.087]
Main source of subsistence (ref. : agriculture)
Mining/quarrying 0.218 0.246 -0.056 -0.264 -0.064
[0.135] [0.184] [0.411] [0.222] [0.548]
Processing industry 0.080+ -0.054 0.226 -0.051 0.064
[0.043] [0.107] [0.138] [0.169] [0.165]
Electricity/gas/water -0.397 -0.907 -0.246 0.086
[0.354] [0.726] [1.031] [0.847]
Construction 0.277** 0.206+ 0.299+ 0.250 0.321+
[0.050] [0.109] [0.165] [0.199] [0.165]
Trade -0.061+ -0.167* -0.093 -0.661** -0.067
[0.035] [0.076] [0.109] [0.170] [0.122]
Transport/storage/communication 0.182** 0.069 0.213 -0.212 -0.181
[0.050] [0.100] [0.148] [0.217] [0.180]
ii
Finance/real estate -0.196 -0.805+ -0.687 -1.021 -0.839
[0.161] [0.463] [0.740] [1.023] [0.755]
Services 0.081+ 0.075 -0.163 -0.031 -0.027
[0.043] [0.082] [0.131] [0.161] [0.108]
Other -0.017 0.381 0.601 -1.428 0.816
[0.175] [0.318] [0.567] [1.026] [0.852]
Income recipient -0.197** -0.315** -0.394* -0.604* -0.033
[0.054] [0.121] [0.160] [0.264] [0.165]
Household owns holy book -0.083** 0.213** 0.071 0.178 0.344**
[0.028] [0.074] [0.100] [0.115] [0.070]
Status of house (ref. : own property)
Lease -0.495** -0.139 -0.301 -0.623 -1.093*
[0.090] [0.127] [0.262] [0.524] [0.440]
Rent -0.561** 0.097 -1.263** -0.884** -1.110**
[0.123] [0.095] [0.466] [0.301] [0.310]
Official 0.507** 0.050 -0.205 -0.569+ -0.271
[0.131] [0.139] [0.340] [0.334] [0.182]
Free 0.055 0.141 0.064 -0.221 0.193
[0.065] [0.095] [0.152] [0.234] [0.170]
Other 0.030 0.233 0.607** -0.327 0.072
[0.103] [0.158] [0.202] [0.342] [0.233]
Type of roof (ref. : concrete)
Corrugated tile 0.066 -0.368* -0.256 -1.098* -0.985**
[0.113] [0.169] [0.320] [0.504] [0.276]
Shingle roof -0.344 -0.072 0.348 -0.964* -1.111+
[0.323] [0.267] [0.423] [0.477] [0.589]
Iron sheeting -0.080 -0.376* -0.223 -0.819+ -0.552*
[0.133] [0.160] [0.267] [0.476] [0.269]
Asbestos 0.006 -0.078 -0.385 -2.108* -0.725
[0.178] [0.259] [0.502] [0.855] [0.455]
Sugar palm fibre 0.085 -0.481 -0.136 -0.004 -0.434
[0.322] [0.354] [0.363] [0.609] [0.493]
Leaves/other -0.097 0.043 0.194 -0.569 -0.795**
[0.158] [0.172] [0.279] [0.479] [0.273]
Type of wall (ref. : brick)
Wood 0.162** 0.438** 0.264* 0.492* 0.568**
[0.036] [0.059] [0.107] [0.227] [0.102]
Bamboo 0.522** 0.600** 0.461** 0.805* 0.270**
[0.034] [0.097] [0.126] [0.320] [0.091]
Other 0.242+ 0.191 0.243 0.453+ 0.338**
[0.145] [0.196] [0.162] [0.250] [0.100]
Type of floor (ref. : marble/ceramic)
Floor tile 0.460** 0.152 0.125 -0.257 0.624+
[0.059] [0.200] [0.372] [0.531] [0.349]
Cement plaster 0.901** 0.405** 0.869** 0.391 0.604*
[0.057] [0.151] [0.308] [0.436] [0.270]
Wood 0.810** 0.240 0.602+ -0.007 0.506+
[0.101] [0.162] [0.321] [0.420] [0.293]
Bamboo 1.070** 0.430+ 0.977** 0.158 0.514
[0.100] [0.247] [0.349] [0.566] [0.319]
Earth 1.137** 0.575** 1.073** 0.443 0.817**
[0.070] [0.176] [0.337] [0.477] [0.286]
Other 0.138 0.515 0.167 1.401* 1.398**
[0.234] [0.561] [0.578] [0.611] [0.325]
Source drinking of water (ref. : bottled water)
Tap -0.402* 0.064 0.540 1.343 0.288
[0.167] [0.305] [0.487] [1.056] [0.515]
Pump -0.476** 0.223 -0.347 0.777 0.538
[0.181] [0.338] [0.534] [1.144] [0.560]
Protected well -0.462* 0.282 0.318 0.855 0.150
iii
[0.180] [0.323] [0.518] [1.143] [0.558]
Unprotected well -0.346+ 0.097 0.463 0.829 0.617
[0.182] [0.325] [0.522] [1.139] [0.558]
Protected spring -0.393* 0.396 0.631 -0.705 0.190
[0.181] [0.327] [0.518] [1.227] [0.556]
Unprotected spring -0.457* 0.013 0.063 0.680 0.415
[0.184] [0.333] [0.538] [1.202] [0.557]
River -0.182 0.104 -0.132 0.563 0.120
[0.205] [0.326] [0.560] [1.135] [0.561]
Rain water/other -0.202 0.532 -0.046 0.461 -0.339
[0.194] [0.332] [0.547] [1.139] [0.570]
Do not purchase drinking water 0.106 -0.069 0.236 0.502 -0.041
[0.071] [0.116] [0.188] [0.433] [0.214]
Drinking water facility
Shared 0.251** 0.256** 0.161+ 0.216 0.316**
[0.029] [0.059] [0.085] [0.136] [0.090]
Public 0.061 0.259** -0.186+ -0.172 0.457**
[0.037] [0.072] [0.106] [0.154] [0.091]
None 0.081 0.192* 0.241+ 0.476** 0.459**
[0.059] [0.087] [0.141] [0.134] [0.127]
Source of light (ref. : PLN electricity)
Non-PLN electricity -0.199 -0.173 0.667** -1.143** 0.265
[0.124] [0.114] [0.200] [0.378] [0.166]
Pump lantern -0.073 0.160* 0.431** 0.286 0.559**
[0.097] [0.078] [0.120] [0.176] [0.137]
Oil lamp 0.019 0.308** 0.131 0.183+ 0.145+
[0.043] [0.061] [0.095] [0.100] [0.080]
Other -0.221 0.008 -0.098 -0.068 -0.048
[0.247] [0.248] [0.459] [0.421] [0.189]
Toilet facilities (ref. private)
Shared 0.061 -0.000 0.078 0.596** -0.007
[0.039] [0.083] [0.115] [0.138] [0.115]
Public 0.320** 0.419** 0.639** 0.755** 0.213
[0.051] [0.085] [0.167] [0.151] [0.152]
Other 0.228** 0.151+ 0.028 -0.115 0.237*
[0.048] [0.077] [0.130] [0.137] [0.103]
Toilet disposal (ref. : septic tank)
Pond/rice field -0.045 0.417** -0.015 -0.005 0.793**
[0.063] [0.123] [0.260] [0.494] [0.277]
River/lake/sea 0.200** 0.218** 0.303* 0.496** 0.180
[0.049] [0.085] [0.147] [0.168] [0.133]
Hole 0.220** 0.306** 0.139 0.233 0.441**
[0.036] [0.071] [0.099] [0.156] [0.098]
Shore/open field 0.363** 0.209+ 0.291* 0.519* 0.168
[0.072] [0.112] [0.142] [0.217] [0.133]
Other 0.016 0.195+ 0.029 0.460+ 0.297*
[0.089] [0.111] [0.185] [0.239] [0.140]
Nr. of Puskesmas in village 0.004 -0.011 0.051 -0.046 -0.113
[0.031] [0.061] [0.091] [0.102] [0.070]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas in village -0.186** -0.058 -0.051 -0.127+ -0.311**
[0.025] [0.041] [0.067] [0.073] [0.057]
Nr. of Polindes in village -0.016 -0.137** -0.094 0.072 -0.258**
[0.028] [0.051] [0.094] [0.088] [0.081]
Nr. doctors living in village per 1,000
inhabitants
0.236** 0.131** -0.174 -0.037 0.080+
[0.037] [0.046] [0.108] [0.152] [0.048]
Nr. village midwifes living in village per 1,000
inhabitants
0.326** 0.193** -0.002 0.366** 0.116*
[0.067] [0.032] [0.110] [0.081] [0.048]
Majority of inter village traffic by land -0.942* 0.651** 0.182 0.417** 0.075
iv
[0.378] [0.119] [0.190] [0.112] [0.134]
Health facilities easy or very easy to reach 0.064 -0.117+ -0.293* 0.036 0.236**
[0.061] [0.070] [0.115] [0.125] [0.087]
Education head of village
(ref. : not completed primary school)
Primary -0.217 -0.375** 0.015 1.189** 0.499**
[0.140] [0.141] [0.311] [0.274] [0.154]
Junior secondary -0.159 -0.516** 0.228 1.025** 0.226
[0.140] [0.141] [0.295] [0.277] [0.158]
Senior secondary -0.117 -0.471** 0.208 0.818** 0.259
[0.139] [0.140] [0.293] [0.280] [0.160]
Higher -0.176 -0.420** 0.365 0.774* 0.472**
[0.141] [0.156] [0.301] [0.327] [0.179]
Rural area -0.159** 0.243** -0.095 -0.194 0.235*
[0.039] [0.084] [0.123] [0.186] [0.111]
IDT village 0.066* 0.205** 0.103 -0.071 0.034
[0.030] [0.056] [0.082] [0.093] [0.096]
BKKBN poverty rate in sub-district, Jan. 1999 0.892** 0.835** 0.358 0.893** 0.114
[0.085] [0.162] [0.292] [0.294] [0.185]
Constant -2.201** -3.783** -4.565** -4.503** -6.587**
[0.493] [0.491] [0.798] [1.300] [0.777]
District dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 87,061 43,381 23,779 15,697 22,441
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.26
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Coefficients for district dummy variables not shown.
Table A - 2 Exogeneity SSN budget data and trend in utilisation 1997 – 1998
(1) (2) (3)
Outpatient 1998-1997 Public 1998-1997 Private 1998-1997
SSN per capita in district -0.0013 -0.0014 0.0000
[0.0020] [0.0013] [0.0012]
Constant -0.0252** -0.0162** -0.0077**
[0.0038] [0.0026] [0.0023]
Observations 292 292 292
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
vTable A - 3 Impact of health card ownership on utilisation of outpatient services (pure health card effect, 3 month reference period)
Outpatient care Intervention group Control group Difference
( βˆ )
[s.e.]a % Change Direct effect
( βˆpˆ )
pˆ N treated N control
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.1264 0.1110 0.0153 [0.0036] 13.8 0.0028 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.1475 0.1362 0.0113 [0.0045] 8.3 0.0015 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.1592 0.1420 0.0172 [0.0049] 12.1 0.0018 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.1767 0.1598 0.0170 [0.0061] 10.6 0.0012 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1773 0.1754 0.0019 [0.0084] 1.1 0.0001 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.1409 0.1325 0.0083 [0.0032] 6.3 0.0009 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.1566 0.1454 0.0111 [0.0033] 7.6 0.0012 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.1615 0.1514 0.0101 [0.0049] 6.7 0.0007 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.1440 0.1352 0.0089 [0.0025] 6.6 0.0011 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.1488 0.1391 0.0098 [0.0022] 7.0 0.0010 0.106 76,473 73,598
Public
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0950 0.0710 0.0240 [0.0031] 33.9 0.0044 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.1000 0.0755 0.0245 [0.0035] 32.4 0.0034 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.1056 0.0762 0.0293 [0.0039] 38.5 0.0031 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.1115 0.0820 0.0296 [0.0047] 36.1 0.0021 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1146 0.0731 0.0414 [0.0063] 56.7 0.0015 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.0922 0.0697 0.0225 [0.0024] 32.3 0.0024 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.1118 0.0810 0.0308 [0.0027] 38.1 0.0033 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.1030 0.0734 0.0296 [0.0038] 40.4 0.0021 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.1018 0.0760 0.0258 [0.0020] 34.0 0.0033 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.1021 0.0754 0.0268 [0.0018] 35.5 0.0028 0.106 76,473 73,598
Private
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0313 0.0400 -0.0087 [0.0021] -21.8 -0.0016 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.0475 0.0608 -0.0132 [0.0031] -21.7 -0.0018 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.0537 0.0658 -0.0121 [0.0034] -18.4 -0.0013 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.0652 0.0778 -0.0126 [0.0042] -16.2 -0.0009 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0627 0.1023 -0.0396 [0.0068] -38.7 -0.0015 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.0486 0.0629 -0.0142 [0.0023] -22.6 -0.0015 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.0447 0.0645 -0.0197 [0.0022] -30.6 -0.0021 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.0585 0.0780 -0.0195 [0.0039] -25.0 -0.0014 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.0422 0.0592 -0.0169 [0.0016] -28.6 -0.0022 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.0467 0.0637 -0.0170 [0.0014] -26.7 -0.0018 0.106 76,473 73,598
a)  Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
vi
Table A - 4 Total effect of SSN budget allocation on change in use of modern outpatient care, public and private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
SSN budget allocation, per capita 0.0039+ 0.0039 0.0073+ 0.0012 0.0065* 0.0075* 0.0037+ 0.0040+ 0.0045 0.0060*
[0.0022] [0.0041] [0.0038] [0.0029] [0.0032] [0.0036] [0.0022] [0.0024] [0.0048] [0.0028]
Diff. age -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0109* 0.0004 -0.0030 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0007 0.0044 -0.0011
[0.0031] [0.0059] [0.0053] [0.0041] [0.0045] [0.0051] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0061] [0.0040]
Diff. household size 0.0073 -0.0056 -0.0394+ -0.0025 0.0185 0.0144 0.0059 0.0089 -0.0140 0.0153
[0.0121] [0.0230] [0.0207] [0.0158] [0.0175] [0.0200] [0.0123] [0.0130] [0.0233] [0.0155]
Diff. % population in rural area 0.0032 0.0600 0.0107 -0.0409 0.0112 0.0792 -0.0042 0.0103 -0.0069 0.0078
[0.0306] [0.0601] [0.0522] [0.0399] [0.0441] [0.0504] [0.0310] [0.0329] [0.0636] [0.0381]
Diff. population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diff. poverty rate (P0) -0.0065 -0.0200 0.0375 0.0436+ 0.0172 0.0281 -0.0074 -0.0060 -0.0193 -0.0187
[0.0182] [0.0339] [0.0310] [0.0237] [0.0262] [0.0299] [0.0184] [0.0195] [0.0350] [0.0228]
Diff. poverty gap (P1) 0.0387* -0.0121 0.0330 0.0579** 0.0554* 0.0445+ 0.0272+ 0.0495** 0.0245 0.0302
[0.0159] [0.0300] [0.0272] [0.0208] [0.0230] [0.0263] [0.0161] [0.0172] [0.0306] [0.0205]
Sumatra 0.0001 -0.0062 -0.0038 0.0035 -0.0016 -0.0070 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0129 0.0032
[0.0049] [0.0092] [0.0083] [0.0064] [0.0071] [0.0081] [0.0050] [0.0053] [0.0093] [0.0063]
Sulawesi -0.0203** -0.0156 -0.0182+ -0.0178* -0.0274** -0.0202+ -0.0168** -0.0236** -0.0307* -0.0192*
[0.0063] [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0082] [0.0091] [0.0104] [0.0064] [0.0068] [0.0122] [0.0081]
Kalimantan -0.0044 0.0013 -0.0036 -0.0047 0.0044 -0.0111 -0.0039 -0.0050 -0.0060 0.0021
[0.0067] [0.0125] [0.0114] [0.0087] [0.0096] [0.0110] [0.0068] [0.0072] [0.0129] [0.0084]
Other islands 0.0041 -0.0134 -0.0139 0.0105 -0.0068 -0.0135 0.0041 0.0044 -0.0259 0.0017
[0.0080] [0.0151] [0.0137] [0.0105] [0.0116] [0.0133] [0.0081] [0.0087] [0.0157] [0.0101]
Constant -0.0151+ 0.0087 -0.0173 -0.0281* -0.0301* -0.0279+ -0.0103 -0.0197* -0.0103 -0.0155
[0.0087] [0.0164] [0.0148] [0.0113] [0.0125] [0.0143] [0.0088] [0.0094] [0.0170] [0.0112]
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.06
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A - 5 Total effect of SSN budget allocation on change in use of public outpatient care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
SSN budget allocation, per capita 0.0033* 0.0035 0.0080* -0.0001 0.0059* 0.0094** 0.0026+ 0.0040* 0.0016 0.0053**
[0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0022] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0032] [0.0020]
Diff. age -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0122* -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0038+ -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0005
[0.0021] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0020] [0.0024] [0.0041] [0.0028]
Diff. household size 0.0029 -0.0088 -0.0353+ -0.0079 0.0075 -0.0032 0.0033 0.0029 -0.0127 0.0119
[0.0081] [0.0184] [0.0184] [0.0119] [0.0127] [0.0125] [0.0077] [0.0092] [0.0156] [0.0110]
Diff. % population in rural area 0.0252 0.0787 0.0246 -0.0555+ 0.0476 0.1037** 0.0075 0.0426+ -0.0136 -0.0015
[0.0203] [0.0481] [0.0464] [0.0300] [0.0321] [0.0314] [0.0194] [0.0233] [0.0427] [0.0271]
Diff. population 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diff. poverty rate (P0) 0.0082 -0.0058 0.0077 0.0407* 0.0082 0.0034 0.0047 0.0114 -0.0070 0.0100
[0.0121] [0.0272] [0.0275] [0.0178] [0.0191] [0.0186] [0.0115] [0.0138] [0.0235] [0.0163]
Diff. poverty gap (P1) 0.0356** -0.0027 0.0174 0.0476** 0.0366* 0.0133 0.0240* 0.0464** 0.0179 0.0343*
[0.0106] [0.0240] [0.0242] [0.0156] [0.0167] [0.0164] [0.0101] [0.0122] [0.0205] [0.0146]
Sumatra -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0099 0.0024 0.0006 -0.0055 -0.0030 0.0000 -0.0157* 0.0039
[0.0032] [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0031] [0.0037] [0.0062] [0.0045]
Sulawesi -0.0153** -0.0121 -0.0186+ -0.0151* -0.0203** -0.0171** -0.0136** -0.0170** -0.0236** -0.0153**
[0.0042] [0.0094] [0.0096] [0.0062] [0.0066] [0.0065] [0.0040] [0.0048] [0.0082] [0.0057]
Kalimantan 0.0013 0.0066 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0053 -0.0033 0.0008 0.0017 -0.0037 0.0052
[0.0044] [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0066] [0.0070] [0.0069] [0.0042] [0.0051] [0.0087] [0.0060]
Other islands -0.0011 -0.0122 -0.0214+ 0.0019 -0.0137 -0.0277** 0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0269* -0.0005
[0.0053] [0.0121] [0.0122] [0.0079] [0.0084] [0.0083] [0.0051] [0.0061] [0.0105] [0.0072]
Constant -0.0128* 0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0180* -0.0170+ -0.0125 -0.0071 -0.0182** -0.0007 -0.0192*
[0.0058] [0.0131] [0.0132] [0.0085] [0.0091] [0.0089] [0.0055] [0.0066] [0.0114] [0.0079]
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A - 6 Total effect of SSN budget allocation on change in use of private outpatient care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
SSN budget allocation, per capita 0.0009 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0005 0.0031 0.0013
[0.0013] [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0028] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0017]
Diff. age -0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0004 0.0039 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0012 0.0065+ -0.0004
[0.0019] [0.0035] [0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0040] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0039] [0.0025]
Diff. household size 0.0085 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0106 0.0158 0.0257 0.0085 0.0085 0.0045 0.0064
[0.0074] [0.0137] [0.0101] [0.0095] [0.0111] [0.0156] [0.0078] [0.0077] [0.0148] [0.0096]
Diff. % population in rural area -0.0269 -0.0061 -0.0141 0.0119 -0.0370 -0.0289 -0.0285 -0.0253 -0.0002 0.0103
[0.0187] [0.0358] [0.0255] [0.0240] [0.0280] [0.0394] [0.0197] [0.0195] [0.0404] [0.0236]
Diff. population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diff. poverty rate (P0) -0.0195+ -0.0219 0.0267+ 0.0054 0.0086 0.0158 -0.0178 -0.0213+ -0.0153 -0.0352*
[0.0111] [0.0202] [0.0151] [0.0142] [0.0166] [0.0234] [0.0117] [0.0116] [0.0222] [0.0142]
Diff. poverty gap (P1) 0.0039 -0.0256 0.0194 0.0191 0.0262+ 0.0265 0.0027 0.0052 0.0012 -0.0033
[0.0097] [0.0179] [0.0133] [0.0125] [0.0146] [0.0206] [0.0103] [0.0102] [0.0194] [0.0127]
Sumatra 0.0017 -0.0038 0.0054 0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0034 -0.0000 0.0025 -0.0004
[0.0030] [0.0055] [0.0041] [0.0038] [0.0045] [0.0063] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0059] [0.0039]
Sulawesi -0.0061 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0090 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0079+ -0.0108 -0.0053
[0.0039] [0.0070] [0.0053] [0.0049] [0.0058] [0.0082] [0.0041] [0.0040] [0.0078] [0.0050]
Kalimantan -0.0063 -0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0065 -0.0054 -0.0073+ -0.0034 -0.0037
[0.0041] [0.0074] [0.0056] [0.0052] [0.0061] [0.0086] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0082] [0.0052]
Other islands 0.0069 -0.0023 0.0072 0.0101 0.0101 0.0187+ 0.0068 0.0070 0.0024 0.0030
[0.0049] [0.0090] [0.0067] [0.0063] [0.0074] [0.0104] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0100] [0.0063]
Constant -0.0029 0.0086 -0.0134+ -0.0159* -0.0175* -0.0141 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0078 0.0027
[0.0053] [0.0098] [0.0072] [0.0068] [0.0080] [0.0112] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0108] [0.0069]
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A - 7 Sensitivity direct effect estimate, outpatient care (1 month recall; probit marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3)
Health card 0.0103** 0.0109** 0.0106*
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0052]
Health card * SSN per capita 0.0034
[0.0025]
Health card * HC allocation per capita -0.0289
[0.0188]
Age 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007**
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Female 0.0076** 0.0075** 0.0075**
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
Female head of household -0.0117** -0.0115** -0.0115**
[0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Education head of household
Primary -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0025
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Junior secondary 0.0054 0.0069+ 0.0069+
[0.0041] [0.0042] [0.0042]
Senior secondary 0.0091* 0.0103* 0.0102*
[0.0044] [0.0044] [0.0044]
Higher 0.0464* 0.0489* 0.0486*
[0.0205] [0.0211] [0.0211]
Log household size -0.0380** -0.0381** -0.0380**
[0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026]
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.0129** 0.0126** 0.0125**
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]
Food -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0088
[0.0076] [0.0076] [0.0076]
Clothing 0.0087+ 0.0061 0.0061
[0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0047]
Floor -0.0021 0.0024 0.0024
[0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Health 0.0505** 0.0494** 0.0493**
[0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0221** -0.0220** -0.0220**
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023]
Rural area -0.0072* -0.0102** -0.0103**
[0.0029] [0.0031] [0.0030]
IDT village -0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0036
[0.0022] [0.0023] [0.0023]
Nr. of Puskesmas in village 0.0103** 0.0119** 0.0119**
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas in village 0.0067** 0.0081** 0.0081**
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0269** -0.0270**
[0.0060] [0.0060]
SSN per capita in district 0.0126** 0.0112**
[0.0016] [0.0020]
HC allocation per capita in district 0.1059** 0.1195**
[0.0109] [0.0146]
Poverty rate (P0) -0.0179** -0.0181**
[0.0067] [0.0067]
Poverty gap (P1) -0.0041 -0.0029
[0.0106] [0.0106]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,889
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors in brackets
xTable A - 8 Sensitivity direct effect estimate, public care (1 month recall; probit marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3)
Health card 0.0224** 0.0235** 0.0272**
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0038]
Health card * SSN per capita -0.0015
[0.0019]
Health card * HC allocation per capita -0.0059
[0.0137]
Age 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002**
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female 0.0098** 0.0097** 0.0097**
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
Female head of household -0.0064** -0.0065** -0.0065**
[0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024]
Education head of household
Primary -0.0041* -0.0040* -0.0040*
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Junior secondary -0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]
Senior secondary -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0012
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]
Higher -0.0228** -0.0229** -0.0229**
[0.0060] [0.0059] [0.0059]
Log household size -0.0228** -0.0234** -0.0234**
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.0163** 0.0154** 0.0153**
[0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Food -0.0155* -0.0133* -0.0132*
[0.0063] [0.0062] [0.0062]
Clothing -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0039
[0.0039] [0.0040] [0.0039]
Floor 0.0015 0.0044** 0.0044*
[0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Health 0.0310** 0.0307** 0.0307**
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0119** -0.0125** -0.0125**
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Rural area -0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0027
[0.0022] [0.0023] [0.0023]
IDT village 0.0058** 0.0021 0.0020
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Nr. of Puskesmas in village 0.0086** 0.0098** 0.0098**
[0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas in village 0.0108** 0.0118** 0.0119**
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0199** -0.0198**
[0.0041] [0.0041]
SSN per capita in district 0.0119** 0.0125**
[0.0012] [0.0015]
HC allocation per capita in district 0.0470** 0.0507**
[0.0077] [0.0114]
Poverty rate (P0) -0.0087+ -0.0090+
[0.0051] [0.0051]
Poverty gap (P1) 0.0261** 0.0258**
[0.0077] [0.0077]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,889
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A - 9 Sensitivity direct effect estimate, private care (1 month recall; probit marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3)
Health card -0.0111** -0.0113** -0.0140**
[0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0038]
Health card * SSN per capita 0.0035+
[0.0019]
Health card * HC allocation per capita -0.0161
[0.0140]
Age 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006**
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022
[0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
Female head of household -0.0075** -0.0072** -0.0073**
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Education head of household
Primary 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Junior secondary 0.0051 0.0057+ 0.0057+
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]
Senior secondary 0.0106** 0.0117** 0.0117**
[0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033]
Higher 0.0656** 0.0685** 0.0682**
[0.0205] [0.0210] [0.0210]
Log household size -0.0189** -0.0184** -0.0183**
[0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0017
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Food 0.0050 0.0034 0.0032
[0.0048] [0.0049] [0.0049]
Clothing 0.0121** 0.0106** 0.0106**
[0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Floor -0.0033* -0.0013 -0.0013
[0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Health 0.0220** 0.0210** 0.0210**
[0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0020]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0125** -0.0118** -0.0118**
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Rural area -0.0067** -0.0076** -0.0077**
[0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022]
IDT village -0.0065** -0.0061** -0.0060**
[0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Nr. of Puskesmas in village 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022
[0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas in village -0.0042** -0.0039** -0.0039**
[0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0066 -0.0066
[0.0046] [0.0046]
SSN per capita in district 0.0014 -0.0000
[0.0012] [0.0014]
HC allocation per capita in district 0.0693** 0.0760**
[0.0082] [0.0101]
Poverty rate (P0) -0.0155** -0.0155**
[0.0047] [0.0047]
Poverty gap (P1) -0.0336** -0.0328**
[0.0078] [0.0078]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,889
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03
Robust standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A - 10 Sensitivity direct effect estimate to selection on needs bias (pure health card effect, 1month reference period)
Outpatient care Intervention group Control group Difference
( βˆ )
[s.e.]a % Change Direct effect
( βˆpˆ )
pˆ N treated N control
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0993 0.0866 0.0127 [0.0031] 14.7 0.0023 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.1205 0.1056 0.0149 [0.0041] 14.1 0.0020 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.1330 0.1197 0.0132 [0.0047] 11.0 0.0014 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.1450 0.1378 0.0072 [0.0058] 5.2 0.0005 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1509 0.1468 0.0041 [0.0076] 2.8 0.0002 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.1155 0.1097 0.0059 [0.0028] 5.4 0.0006 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.1269 0.1167 0.0102 [0.0029] 8.8 0.0011 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.1390 0.1316 0.0074 [0.0049] 5.6 0.0005 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.1147 0.1073 0.0074 [0.0022] 6.9 0.0009 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.1213 0.1132 0.0081 [0.0020] 7.1 0.0009 0.106 76,956 74,263
Public
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0729 0.0534 0.0195 [0.0025] 36.5 0.0036 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.0784 0.0577 0.0207 [0.0032] 35.9 0.0028 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.0855 0.0614 0.0240 [0.0036] 39.2 0.0025 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.0914 0.0685 0.0230 [0.0044] 33.5 0.0016 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0840 0.0665 0.0175 [0.0056] 26.3 0.0006 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.0732 0.0561 0.0171 [0.0022] 30.5 0.0018 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.0871 0.0639 0.0231 [0.0023] 36.1 0.0025 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.0867 0.0681 0.0187 [0.0036] 27.4 0.0014 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.0778 0.0575 0.0203 [0.0017] 35.3 0.0026 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.0802 0.0601 0.0201 [0.0016] 33.5 0.0021 0.106 76,956 74,263
Private
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0305 0.0374 -0.0069 [0.0020] -18.3 -0.0013 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.0495 0.0544 -0.0048 [0.0029] -8.9 -0.0007 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.0572 0.0655 -0.0083 [0.0035] -12.7 -0.0009 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.0654 0.0796 -0.0142 [0.0043] -17.8 -0.0010 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0803 0.0941 -0.0138 [0.0062] -14.6 -0.0005 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.0500 0.0606 -0.0106 [0.0022] -17.5 -0.0011 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.0478 0.0605 -0.0127 [0.0021] -21.1 -0.0014 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.0613 0.0706 -0.0092 [0.0037] -13.1 -0.0007 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.0442 0.0574 -0.0132 [0.0016] -22.9 -0.0017 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.0489 0.0606 -0.0117 [0.0015] -19.3 -0.0012 0.106 76,956 74,263
a)  Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
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Table A - 11 Sensitivity total effect estimate (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outpatient Outpatient Public Public Private Private
SSN per capita in district 0.0042 0.0044 0.0037* 0.0039+ 0.0007 0.0007
[0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0019] [0.0022] [0.0017] [0.0020]
Health card coverage in district -0.0118 -0.0159 0.0081
[0.0628] [0.0421] [0.0381]
SSN*HC -0.0054 -0.0060 0.0020
[0.0244] [0.0163] [0.0148]
Diff. age -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0019] [0.0019]
Diff. household size 0.0081 0.0083 0.0039 0.0040 0.0080 0.0082
[0.0128] [0.0129] [0.0086] [0.0086] [0.0078] [0.0078]
Diff. % population in rural area 0.0033 0.0034 0.0254 0.0255 -0.0270 -0.0269
[0.0308] [0.0308] [0.0207] [0.0206] [0.0187] [0.0187]
Diff. population -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diff. poverty rate (P0) -0.0060 -0.0063 0.0088 0.0084 -0.0198+ -0.0196+
[0.0184] [0.0183] [0.0124] [0.0122] [0.0112] [0.0111]
Diff. poverty gap (P1) 0.0385* 0.0381* 0.0353** 0.0349** 0.0040 0.0041
[0.0161] [0.0163] [0.0108] [0.0109] [0.0098] [0.0099]
Sumatra -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0022 0.0019
[0.0064] [0.0057] [0.0043] [0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0035]
Sulawesi -0.0214* -0.0213** -0.0169** -0.0164** -0.0053 -0.0058
[0.0090] [0.0078] [0.0060] [0.0052] [0.0054] [0.0047]
Kalimantan -0.0055 -0.0053 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0056 -0.0060
[0.0090] [0.0079] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0055] [0.0048]
Other islands 0.0029 0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0017 0.0077 0.0071
[0.0102] [0.0085] [0.0068] [0.0057] [0.0062] [0.0051]
Constant -0.0138 -0.0143 -0.0110 -0.0119+ -0.0038 -0.0032
[0.0113] [0.0095] [0.0076] [0.0063] [0.0068] [0.0058]
Observations 293 293 293 293 293 293
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06
Instrumented HC SSN*HC HC SSN*HC HC SSN*HC
Over-identifying restrictions test
χ2 (1) 0.110 0.096 0.009 0.018 0.662 0.690
Probability 0.741 0.756 0.923 0.893 0.416 0.406
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
F (1, 279) 1.667 1.592 3.784 3.888 0.027 0.008
Probability 0.198 0.208 0.053 0.050 0.870 0.928
First stage regression HC SSN*HC
Instruments
BKKBN pre-prosperous 0.2315** 0.5833**
[0.0347] [0.0823]
BKKBN KS1 0.0285 -0.0187
[0.0535] [0.1270]
(other results omitted)
Joint significance instruments
F (1, 279) 22.807 26.786
Probability 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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 Table A - 12 Exogeneity BKKBN data and trend in utilisation 1997 – 1998
(1) (2) (3)
Outpatient 1998-1997 Public 1998-1997 Private 1998-1997
BKKBN pre-prosperous -0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0030
[0.0111] [0.0076] [0.0066]
BKKBN prosperous I -0.0143 -0.0182 -0.0006
[0.0190] [0.0130] [0.0113]
Constant -0.0230** -0.0135** -0.0070*
[0.0056] [0.0038] [0.0033]
Observations 292 292 292
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
